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ESTHETICS OF COLDNESS
The Romantic Scene
and a
Glimpse At Baudelaire
Jurgen Klein

ny reflection on coldness as an aesthetic mode within
European romanticism, will discover Caspar David
Friedrich's canvas The Ice Sea (Das Eismeer, Die
gescheiterte Hojfnun^ as its most famous visualization. The painting
shows gigantic iceblocks, one towering on top of the other. A ship is
crushed by the pressure of the ice. As a manmade item it is nearly
invisible in the picture.
The art critic Carl August Bottiger remarked in Artistisches
Notizenblatt (March 1825) that ice paintings of his time reminded him
of James Thomson's Winter, which had been translated into German in
1823 by Soltau. Art history has proved so far that even Friedrich's Ice
Sea refers to the catastrophic outcome of the north pole expedition, led
by William Edward Parry in 1819 to 1820. When Parry reached
Lancaster Sound the terrible ice desert spread out for over 100 miles; he

80

1650-1850

counted more than 180 ice-mountains.' Parry failed to find the
northwest passage on his way to the pole.^
Though Friedrich's canvas reminds us of historical arctic expedi
tions, its semantics reaches much further than any historical determina
tion. The painting gives expression to an sesthetic antinomy, if not
dialectics, between the mathematical and the dynamical sublime in a
Kantian sense {Critique of Judgment, 1790). Kant characterizes the
dynamic sublime by a list of natural environments inciting the feeling
of terror (and thus sublimity) in the spectator:
Kiihne, iiberhangende, gleichsam drohende Felsen, am
Himmel sich auftiirmende Donnerwolken, mit Blitzen und
Krachen einherziehend, Vulkane in ihrer ganzen storenden
Gewalt, Orkane mit ihrer zuriickgelassenen Verwiistung, der
grenzenlose Ozean in Emporung gesetzt,....machen unser
Vermogen zu widerstehen in Vergleichung mit ihrer Macht
zur unbedeutenden Kleinigkeit. Aber ihr Anblick wird nur
um desto anziehender, je furchtbarer er ist, wenn wir uns nur
in Sicherheit befinden; und wir nennen diese Gegenstande
gern erhaben, weil sie die Seelenstarke iiber ihr gewohnliches
MittelmaC erhohen und ein Vermogen zu widerstehen von
ganz anderer Art in uns entdecken lassen, welches uns Mut
macht, uns mit der scheinbaren Allgewalt der Natur messen
zu konnen."'
Though the single human being cannot overcome the powers of nature
(see Friedrich's wreck in the arctic sea), it is nevertheless possible to
expand one's imagination and reason in order to discover the subjective
potentiality of our mind and soul. Uncouth masses of rock in their
chaotic wildness, pyramids of ice, and the dark and raving sea are
phenomena of nature, which are not identical with the sublime, but
strengthen the powers of our interior faculties of imagination, will, and
' Ernst Samhaber, Geschichte der Entdeckungsreisen (Munchen: Thomas Knauer Verlag, 1955),
405.
^ See Werner Hofmann,Caspar David Friedrich (Munchen: Prestel Verlag,1981) 258-9.See Peter
Rautmann, C. D. Friedrich. Das Fismeer (Frankfurt: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1994).
' Immanuel Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft, ed. Karl Vorlander (Leipzig: Felix Meiner Verlag,
1922), 107.
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reason/ The sublime is a subjective expression of man on account to
natural phenomena, but does not converge with the natural scenes
themselves. The imagination conflates the ideas of reason. Reason—thus
incited—recalls man's ethical substance, so that his inner forces of
resistance and creativity are emphasized. What cannot be achieved
physically, can be thought and felt.'
If Friedrich's painting mirrors a catastrophe, which overcame a
group of explorers, one easily could stop at the phenomenal refer
ence—and thus give up any further train of reflection. A closer look
especially at some famous works of English romantic literature,
however, makes it obvious, that there is more at stake than a simple
thematic coincidence.
The discovery of the self in eighteenth century art and literature
is deeply connected with ideas of negativity and destruction, analysis,
and—of course—coldness. According to Schiller external greatness can
give an impulse to man to recognize in him self—as if in a mir
ror—absolute greatness. Human ideas thus can overreach any mode of
the sensual-infinite. This exactly is Friedrich's point of departure or his
perspective. The Eismeer is seen from an imaginary viewpoint, which
lies beyond the "frame" of the painting. Friedrich makes clear to the
spectator that man can be destroyed by nature, but that nevertheless
this does not necessarily lead to the loss of spiritual greatness. The
infinity of nature is symbolized by Friedrich's foggy background—the
expansion of the arctic sea. The work of art as such does not imply a
spot of real danger, because it is the work of artistic imagination. It is
a fiction, which affects the workings of our moral sense. .(Esthetics
therefore can be seen as providing a bridge towards ethics. Nature is
still a field of vision, a spatial and material dimension of potentiality.
Unexplored territories sharpen not only the sense of power, but at the
same time provide a space for projecting ones search for perfection.
Inner nature is pictured within outer nature.
If we reflect on coldness, we cannot avoid to note that warmth is
its correlative concept. Both concepts are related to man on a higher
level. Man has the tragic destiny according to Lord Byron to be "half

' Kant, 101.
' See Rautmann, C. D. Friedrich, 20-21.
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dust, half deity".^ Subjectivity as sensual and intellectual pattern at the
same time does not only reflect the sphere of emotion and thought, but
it also constitutes the difference between nature and reason as such.
Natural creations thus are substantially different from human creations
and both simultaneously reflect possibilities of meaningfulness. Though
coldness and warmth can be studied within the scientific frameworks of
chemistry, physics^, biology, they are nevertheless dealt with in
epistemology, esthetics and literary theory. Human subjectivity as a
principle includes according to Immanuel Kant the quality of the thing
in itself (noumenon) and the quality of sensible existence (phtenomenon).' Coldness and warmth as related to man are closely connected
with the within-without-relationship. In metaphorical sense coldness
stands for abstraction/destruction' and warmth for liveliness.
By transferring these distinctions to English romantic literature, it
becomes obvious that warmth and coldness in their extreme mode
define contradictory types of life—inner life and outer life. English
romanticism—for example, Wordsworth—looks at nature as the others
of all that, which was made by man. Wordsworth rejects the thought
lessness and "the uniformity of their [(o^ men in cities] occupation."'"
all good poetry is the spontaneous overflow of powerful
feelings: but though this be true, poems to which any value

' Byron's Works (Leipzig; Bernhard Tauchnitz, 1866), vol. IV, 185.
' "Mochten wohl alle Korper ohne Warme, mochte alia Materia ohne Warme, vielleicht gar
keine Verwandtschaft tnehr untereinander haben?—Aber ohne Warme mochte auch wohl gar
keine verschiedene Materia, und keine iiberhaupt mehr stattfinden!" 0ohann Wilhelm Ritter,
Frapnenteausdem Nachlasseeines jungen Physikers [Heidelberg 1810; rpt. Hanau: VerlagMiiller
und Kiepenheuer,1984], 64 [Fragment I.l]).
' See Kants Werke, Akademie-Textausgabe, Band HI (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1968), 202 ff.
' Gotthilf Heinrich Schubert compares the growing glaciers of Switzerland with those of
Greenland. Green meadows are changed into ice deserts: "Das Eis der Gletscher nimmt auch
nach einer durchgangigen Erfahrung der Eingebohrnen mit jedem Jahre zu, und ehehin grune
Wiesen sind jetzt von Eisflachen verdrangt, so wie das noch vor Jahrhunderten bliihende
Gronland, jetzt eine traurige WildniE voller Schnee und Eis ist, wie die noch vor einem
Menschenalter freyen Hafen nordlicher Kiisten jetzt von Eis versperrt sind, und von Norden
abwarts, ein Wald nach dem andern ausstirbt, ohne dafi die Bediirfnisse des Menschen der
vernichtenden Natur vorgriffen." (Gotthilf Heinrich Schubert, Ansichten von den Nachseiten
derNaturwissenschafi,[Dresden 1808, rpt. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft ,1967],
227).
William Wordsworth, "Preface to Lyrical Ballads" (1802),in M. H. Abrams (ed.). The Norton
Anthology of English Literature, 6''" ed.(New York: Norton, 1993), 145.
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can be attached, were never produced on any variety of
subjects but by a man who, being possessed of more than
usual organic sensibility, had also thought long and deeply.
For our continued influxes of feeling are modified and
directed by our thoughts, which are indeed the representa
tives of all our past feelings; and, as by contemplating the
relation of these general representatives to each other we
discover what is really important to men, so, by the repeti
tion and continuance of this act, our feelings will be con
nected with important subjects."
Of course, nature can show itself in a beautiful or a sublime quality. Its
dangerous and awful aspects tend towards the sublime. That is why the
impartiality or disinterestedness of nature in respect of man's destiny
has been emphasized by Coleridge, Shelley, and Byron. A person
despising earthbound fellow creatures tends towards the loneliness of/in
nature and tries to connect an intellectual hubris or at least the noblesse
of solitude with the natural forces of creation and destruction. In
Solitude: On the Mind and the Heart, the Swiss physician and author
Johann Georg Zimmermann (1728-1795) interprets the influence of
sublime nature on the human mind:
"Many men have in Solitude acquired so great a superiority
as to enable them to defy events: many champions of virtue,
like the majestic cedar, which braves the fury of the loudest
wind, have resisted in retirement all the storms of vice....
many... have proved that wisdom cannot degenerate, even in
the most dreary seclusion. Visited by the august spirits of the
dead, left to listen to their own thoughts, and secluded from
the sight of every breathing object, they must converse with
God alone.""

" Wordsworth, 143-44.
" M. Zimmermann, SolitudeConsidered with Respect to ist Influence upon the Mind andthe Mean
(London, 1824), 76. See^o\i%33i%Vtotaxes,DieBurgerundderNarroderdasRisikoderPhantasie
(Miinchen: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1966), 278-79.
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"To live with nature" then means to live in isolation from one's own
species. At this point the conjunction between imagination and the
sublime comes in.
Long before the romantics and the sentimentalist Zimmermann the
sublime was already given a larger definition in Edmund Burke's
Inquiry into the Origin ofour Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful (1757). In
contrast to Kant Burke combined ethics and aesthetics by his proposi
tion that pain and pleasure , which exclude each other in everyday life,
interpenetrate in aesthetics. Burke extended the semantical territory of
horror, terror of darkness as possible constructions in works of art. For
Burke the beautiful generates pleasure, whereas the sublime very often
is connected with the observance of pain.'' He even goes so far to
assume that destruction in nature can excite a combination of sublimity
and indirect pain.
The immediate expression of pain (and/or the sublime) implies a
basic contradiction within occidental civilization, namely the antithesis
between methodical strategies and immediate human expression. Pain
as an "original response" to physical or psychical experience refers to
living beings treated by fellow beings as objects in the external world or
facing the power of natural forces." "What is quite literally at stake in
the body in pain is the making and unmaking of the world.""
Edmund Burke introduced theidea of pain into the testhetic debate
of the eighteenth century. The reception of pain by a spectator
according to Burke provokes ideas of the sublime:
"When danger or pain press too nearly, they are incapable of
giving any delight, and are simply terrible; but at certain
distances, and with certain modifications, they may be, and
they are delightful, as we every day experience."'^ In his
argument Burke implicitly presupposes the difference
between experience and observation. Experience includes self-

"SeeJurgen Klein, DergotischeRoman unddieAsthetikdes Bosen (Darmstadt:Wissenschaftliche
Buch Gesellschaft,, 1975).
" Elaine Scarry, The Body in Pain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), 5.
" Scarry, 23.
" Edmund Burke, An Inquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful, ed.
James Boulton (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967), 40.
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reference, whereas observation makessure that the destructive
force does not act upon the spectator."'
When intense pain according to Elaine Scarry is world-destroying, then
modified pain on account of my distanced perspective on the act of
destruction gives relatively free play for the imagination allowing thus
the construction of strange worlds defined by otherness.
In English romanticism we very often encounter the proposition
of natural subjectivity as a knowledge of extremes. The interrelation
between epistemological patterns and natural forms refers to negation
and analysis as well as to species, terminations, space, time, and death.
This complex pattern of relations, however, is contrasted to the
individual world of emotions as well as to universality, impartiality, and
disinterestedness of nature. Man as a "border case"—part of na
ture/transcendental intellect—can prove by art as a manmade product,
that he is a creator in analogy to nature. Exactly this point was
emphasized by Samuel Taylor Coleridge in his Biographia Literaria
(1817), in which he developed his theory of imagination." Works of art
as products made by a genius carry in themselves the quality of
coldness. It is important to note, that we have to presuppose a differ
ence between coldness and detachment, insofar as the first is a meta
phor, the latter a mode of experience. Coldness on this level of
argumentation is identical with the power of creation. This refers to the
emanation of abstraction as the faculty of fiction, which converges with
a first rate aesthetic and theoretical condition of world construction.
In Percy Bysshe Shelley's poem Mont Blanc (1816-17) the sublimity
of alpine nature is represented by a highly metaphorical language,
which—however—includes deep thought and reflection. It is the human
mind that is impressed and fascinated by the terror and beauty of
" Burke refers to Robert Francis Damiens (1714-57), who attempted to kill Louis XV and was
put to death after barbarous tortures. At the beginning of Part I., Section VII, Burke writes:
"Whatever is fitted in any son to excite the ideas of pain, and danger, that is to say, whatever
is in anyson terrible, or is conversant about terrible objeas, or operates in a manner analogous
to terror, is a source of the sublime; that is, it is productive of the strongest emotion which the
mind is capable of feeling" (Burke, 39).
" "The primary imagination I hold to be the living power and prime agent of all human
perception, and as a repetition in thefinite mind of the eternal aa of the infiniteI AM."(Samuel
Taylor Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, ed. by George Watson [London: Dent, Dutton, 1971],
167).
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nature, comprising modes of feeling and ways of seeing, which connect
external and internal world;
The everlasting universe of things
Flows through the mind, and rolls ist rapid waves.
Now dark—now glittering—now reflecting gloomNow lending splendor, where from secret springs
The source of human thought ist tribute brings
Of waters,—with a sound but half ist own."
Shelley describes the Ravine of Arve as a symbol of the unbreakable
power, which nature displays in all her willfulness. The receptivity of
the poetic self imagines a dialogue with nature, whereas in factual truth
the physical power of material destruction can only inaugurate great
thoughts and sublime feelings:
Dizzy Ravine! and when I gaze on thee
I seem as in a trance sublime and strange
To muse on my own separate fantasy.
My own, my human mind, which passively
Now renders and receives fast influencing.
Holding an unremitting interchange
With the clear universe of things around;
One legion of wild thoughts, whose wandering wings
Now float above thy darkness, and now rest
Where that or thou art no unbidden guest.
In the still cave of the witch Poesy.^°
The passivity of the human mind undergoes a metamorphosis, if the
vision of sublime nature is transformed into poetic language. What is
fearful to common man, fascinates the poet, because the terror of the
alpine scene incites his imagination, makes the poet condense his visions
and images into literature. Poetic ambiguity, as constitutive for
literature, abstains from mirroring simply, what is seen, felt, and
thought, but enlarges the empirical scene on the "wings of thought."
" Percy Bysshe Shelley, Mont Blanc, in The Norton Anthology of English Literature, vol. 2,666.
^ Shelley, Mont Blanc, 667.

Esthetics of Coldness

87

The "trance sublime and strange" is a state of creativity, where the
boundaries of subject and object are diffuse, slurring over from the one
into the other, thus engendering fictions and visions, worlds clad in
poetic imagery. Shelley refers to the height of the sky as a symbol for
eternity:
Has some unknown omnipotence unfurled
The veil of life and death?
His question does not find an answer. The poet is alone with na
ture—and he sees another image of eternity in the distance, a vision of
coldness, Mont Blanc:
Mont Blanc appears,—still, snowy, and serene—
1st subject mountains their unearthly forms
Pile around it, ice and rock, broad vales between
Of frozen floods, unfathomable deeps.
Blue as the overhanging heaven, that spread
And wind among the accumulated steeps;
The Mont Blanc region is a world of negation. There is no human life.
Cruel and imperious animals like the eagle and the wolf are the only
beings, which tread the icy paths. The ice world negates all the life of
friendlier animals. Mont Blanc is no dwelling-place: "life and joy is lost".
The mountain symbolizes rigid power, terror and isolation.
It is no wonder that Mary Shelley selected ice regions for her
scenes of persecution and destruction. In her novel Frankenstein; or the
Modem Prometheus (1818) Frankenstein follows the monster into the
Mont Blanc region and at the end of the book into the arctic zone.
When Frankenstein pursues the monster into the higher alps, he reflects
on the scenery:
and the solemn silence of this glorious presence-chamber of
imperial nature was broken only by the brawling waves or
the fall of some vast fragment, the thunder sound of the
avalanche or the cracking, reverberated along the mountains,
of the accumulated ice, which, through the silent working of
the immutable laws, was ever and anon rent and torn, as if it
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had been but a plaything in their hands. These sublime and
magnificent scenes afforded me the greatest consolation that
I was capable of receiving. They elevated me from all little
ness of feeling...above rose Mont Blanc, in awful majesty. I
remained in a recess of the rock, gazing on this wonderful and
stupendous scene. The sea, or vast river of ice, wound among
ist dependent mountains, whose aerial summits hung over ist
recesses. Their icy and glittering peaks shone in the sunlight
over the clouds. My heart, which was before sorrowful, now
swelled with something like joy.^'

Whereas in Percy Bysshe Shelley's poem the sublime scenery of the
Mont Blanc region evokes the statement "life and joy is lost", Mary
Shelley's hero Frankenstein welcomes the majesty of the high moun
tains, because they evoke in him "something like joy." How can we
account for this different reaction.^ It makes sense to assume that the
reaction of the poetical self in Percy Bysshe Shelley's text connects the
image of the icy mountains with the abolishment of "normal" human
life in the everyday world. The mountains offer neither comfort nor a
cozy surroundings, they can never provide a homestead for man. In
Mary Shelley's Frankenstein, however, a contrast between normal life
and the sublime mountain area does not provide a basis for interpreta
tion. Frankenstein's joy, evoked by the alpine ice desert presupposes an
exceptional attitude towards human everyday life. He is "happy" within
a region, which human beings tend to flee.
Within eighteenth-century aesthetics the enthusiasm of love,
focused on beauty, has been complemented by the enthusiasm of awe,
which finds ist expression in the sublime. The sublime very often goes
together with the idea of power. Power comprises positive connotations
like "creator", "omnipotence", and "greatness", but at the same time
negative associations like "anxiety" and "annihilation".
In Mary Shelley's Frankenstein the power of the maker and the
power of the created being occur simultaneously. The relation,
however, proves to appear asymmetrical, if we presuppose the Godman-difference. The God-man relationship undergoes a transformation.

Mary Shelley, Frankenstein, in Peter Fairclough, ed., Three Gothic Novels (Harmondsworth:
Penguin, 1968), 360-62.
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so that the tension between physical and intellectual power becomes
predominant. Though Frankenstein's intellectual power is not
overshadowed by the monster, the "maker's" physical power cannot
compete with the monster's strength. In the novel the biblical asymme
try between maker and creature is substituted by a reversal, if it comes
to physical strength. Frankenstein's passionate self-aggrandizement as
a maker is limited and counteracted by his anxiety. Therefore he
experiences a form of the sublime, which he never before anticipated in
connection with his role of creator. Frankenstein's elevation of mind in
the sublime alpine and arctic scenarios is accompanied by terror and
fear. Unlike God he cannot claim absolute superiority over his creation.
The sublimity of coldness in the Mont Blanc area as well as in the arctic
sea illustrates Frankenstein's weakness and fascination at the same time.
There is something, which he cannot overcome, something greater than
himself, though he denies "the comfort of the Divine Protector.In
Frankenstein, the testhetics of coldness partially refers to himself as the
maker, but at the same time goes together with his heated imagination,
his passionate striving to create a being. This combination constitutes
a paradox, because coldness and heat converge, a phenomenon or a
metaphor, which time and again has been used to characterize hell.
Frankenstein's use of "fiery" energy for his act of animation clearly
shows that he takes his scientific means as well as matter and power
from nature, which does not owe her existence to him. He simply
presents himself as secondary creator by exploiting God's nature.
The idea of perfection in art always has been seen as a mode of
coldness. Mary Shelley makes it evident that Frankenstein wants to
create a perfect being, but fails terribly. His misfortune as a maker
therefore mirrors the breaking up of self-aggrandizement. If we reflect
Frankenstein's mental attitude as a maker and as a being, the sublime
acquires a double nature. He is overawed by natural power, especially
by the ice deserts and he is deeply fascinated by his heated imagination
(enthusiasms) as a creator. The sublime therefore refers to different
realms: the realm of the external and the realm of the internal world
(the self). Whereas the making of the being presupposes the infusion of

^ Mary Shelley, Frankenstein, Or, The Modem Prometheus, ed. Maurice Hindle (Harmondswonh; Penguin Books, 1985), 36.
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•warmtli^', Frankenstein's enthusiasm combines "self-animation" and
coldness. In her Preface to Frankenstein (1831), the author refers to talks
on science in the Villa Diodati (1816): "Perhaps a corpse would be
reanimated; galvanism had given token of such things: perhaps the
component parts of the creature might be manufactured, brought
together, and endued with vital warmth."^* The subjective perspective
belongs to the artist/scientist, who has to plan his project carefully. It
is of course well known, that Mary Shelley never gave a clear descrip
tion how the being was made.^' Moreover, her reference to modern

In her Pr^acexo the 1831 edition Mary Shelley remembers the situation at the Lac Leman,
when Byron, Shelley, and Polidori discussed the problem of animation and vital energy. She
refers to Dr. Erasmus Darwin's and Galvani's experiments as a subjett of conversation. The
possibility of reanimating a corpse by galvanism had been taken into consideration. See Mary
Shelley, Frankenstein or. The Modem Prometheus, ed. Maurice Hindle (Harmondsworth 1985)
58. In chapter 2 Frankenstein speaks about his predilection for natural philosophy already as
a very young man. He reads Agrippa of Nettesheim, Paracelsus, and Albertus Magnus, but is
urged by his father to take up modern sciences as a subjea of studies. So Frankenstein turns to
modern chemistry under Professor Waldmann at Ingolstadt. It is, however, interesting to note,
that some aspeas of Mary Shelley's novel concerning the genesis and thedestiny of the monster
remind us of Paracelsus treatise De generationihus rerum naturalium (inU^er^e, vol.5, ed. WillErich Peuckert[Darmstadt 1968],rpt. Klaus Volker[ed.]), KunstlicheMenschen[Miinchen; Carl
hanser Verlag, 1971], 49-59). Paracelstis explains the creation of life by the process of
putrefaaion (warmth in combination with vapours) and suggests that corpses can be reanimated
by anificial putrefaaion. Thus a homunculus can be produced. Artificiality makes creatures
into monsters, because they are not generated by parents. This also is the case in Frankenstein.
Further on Paracelsus remarks that people fear monsters. They are hateful to normality. The
reason for this hatred is founded on theological principles: " Zu diesem soil man wissen, dal5
Gott an den monstris ein Greuel und ein MiSfallen hat imd keinsselig werden kann, alldieweil
sie nit das Bildnis Gottes tragen" (Volker [1971], 54). There can be no doubt that—according to
Paracelsus—monsters disturb God's world order and the beauty of his creation. Consequently,
they have to be destroyed. In Agrippa von Nettesheim's De OccultaPhilosophia, chapter 36, the
influence of the stars is described as the principle of formation for living beings, which attivate
the slumbering energy of sulphur. It produces warmth and steam in the animated being. See
Agrippa von Nettesheim, Deocculta philosophia /Drei BucheriiherdieMagie (Nordlingen:Franx
Greno, 1987), 86-87.
" Mary Shelley, Frankenstein, ed. Maurice Hindle (1985), 58.
"See John Sutherland, "Mary Shelley. Frankenstein. How does Victor make his monsters?," in
J. Sutherland, Is Heathcliff a Murderer?Puzzles in Nineteenth-Century Fiction (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1996), 24-34. Sutherland underlines that Percy Bysshe.Shelley, on account of
his university training and his readings in natural philosophy, could turn to experiments with
elearicity. There is a report concerning Shelley'sexperiments by ThomasJefferson Hogg {The
Lifeof Percy Bysshe Shelley (London, 1858), I, ,70-71; quoted by Sutherland, 25-26). Mary, who
as a woman had no access to university, acquired her experiences of "baby making" from her
own sexual experiences, which included quite a series of catastrophes. Sutherland, referring to
feminist studies (Ellen Moers, Anne K. Mellor, Sandra Gilbert, and Susan Gubar) tries to
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science (galvanism, electricity) cannot be found in the 1818 text of
Frankenstein. When Frankenstein in the alpine desert of high moun
tains, ice and snow experiences "something like joy" a projection of the
gigantic and sublime scene on the spectator's mind becomes "visible"
for the reader. This mind undergoes an illusionary process of selfaggrandizement. The "without" transforms the "within"—and it is the
"within", which characterizes Mary Shelley's novel. The theme of
Frankenstein concentrates on the hubris of intellect, the dangerous and
destructive sublimity of the analytical and synthetical faculties, which
in the final analysis converge with the ideology of instrumental reason
(Max Horkheimer).^^ Frankenstein's intellectual perspective proves to
be rather intricate without his own knowing. On the one hand his
skeptical doubts concerning rational science of his time leads him to
hermetic and alchemical "knowledge", which he acquires at Ingolstadt.
But his meddling with Paracelsus (Philipppus Aureolus Theophrastus
Bombastus von Hohenehim) and Agrippa von Nettesheim^' does not
save him from irresponsible hubris. His enthusiasm for the "making"
reduces reason to method, singles out the operative aspect of knowledge
and procedure^', but neglects reason as a regulative principle:

elaborate on Mary's characterisation of the produaion process as "filthy." English language
users connea "filthy" with sexual intercourse (and its variant, self-abuse) and childbirth (and ist
variant, abortion) (Sutherland, 31).
See Max Horkheimer, 2ur Kritik der instrumentellen Vemunft, Frankfurt: Fischer
Taschenbuch Verlag, 1986).
^ There can be no doubt that Paracelsus and Agrippa undertook their anti-Aristotelian
endeavours in natural magic within a universal framework of platonic-Christian philosophy:
"These scholar-mystics continually repeated their belief that man must study God's Creation
so that he might better understand the Creator himself."(Allen G. Debus, Man and Nature in
the Renaissance [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978], 133). There might have been
some arrogance conneaed with the scholar-mystics, because they felt superior to the
Aristotelians. (See Brian P. Copenhaver and Charles B. Schmitt, Renaissance Philosophy
[Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992], 290). A self-aggrandization similar to that of
Frankenstein, however, is out of the question. The theory of emanation in Agrippa's De
Occulta Philosophia necessarily presupposes Deus. See Wolf-Dieter Muller-Jahncke, Magye als
Wissenschaft im fruhen ISJahrhundert. Die Beziehungen zwischen Magie, Medizin und Pharmazie
im Werk des Agrippa von Nettesheim (1486-1S3S), dissertation from the University of Marburg:
Fotodruck E. Symon, 1973, 85-90. For Paracelsus, see Wolf-Dieter Muller-Jahncke,
"Makrokosmos undMikokosmos bei Paracelsus", in: Volker Zimmermann,eds., Paracelsus. Das
Werk—die Rezeption (Stuttgart: Franz Shiner Verlag, 1995), 59-56.
See Horkheimer (1986), 30-31. See Hans Blumenberg, "Alles uber Futurologie. Ein
Soliloquium", in: Hans .Blumenberg, Ein mogliches Selbstverstdndnis. Aus dem Nachlass,
(Stuttgart: Reclam Verlag, 1997), 29.
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Reason must be subject, in all its operations, to criticism,
•wbicb must always be permitted to exercise its functions
without restraint; otherwise its interests are imperilled, and
its influence obnoxious to suspicion. There is nothing,
however useful, however sacred it may be, that can claim
exemption from the searching examination of this supreme
tribunal, which has no respect of persons."^'

Without any reference to the regulative principle of reason Franken
stein's plan to create or to construe an artificial man has its source in an
ecstasies. His construct can either be a work of art or a monster. Both
results presuppose negation of warmth, humane emotion, because any
direct utterance of emotion, for example enthusiasm, cannot produce
artistic/scientific form. We have to presuppose a dialectics between
Frankenstein's ecstasies as a "maker" and his coldness as a human
individual. His coldness converging with his vast imagination touches
the product as an entity represented in the external world as well as the
testhetic artifice of the novelist. Frankenstein's scientific endeavor
presupposes loneliness and that is: a life without love.^° The dangers of
coldness—considered in an aesthetic and scientific mode—affect his
human substance: "I greatly need a friend, and affection enough not to
despise me as romantic, and affection enough for me to endeavor to
regulate my mind."'^
The affection of a friend is seen as human compensation for
Frankenstein's shortcomings. His romantic craving for the absolute
wants serious affirmation, but at the same time human warmth and
fellow-feeling seems to be necessary in order to correct the unlimited
use of Frankenstein's intellect. The quoted passage makes it clear to the
reader that Frankenstein begins to grasp his own dilemma.
The more Frankenstein loses contact to human beings, the more
he tries to extend the application of his rational faculties. He wants to

" Inunanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. J. M. D. Meiklejohn, intro. A. D. Lindsay
(London: Dent, 1986), 422-423.
" See Rolf Eichler, "In the Romantic Tradition: Frankenstein and The Rocky Horror Picture
Show," in Michasi Gassenmeier and Norbert H. Platz, eds.. Beyond the Suburbs of tbe Mind:
Exploring English Romanticism (Essen: Die Blaue Eule, 1987), 100-102.
" Peter Fairclough, ed.. Three Gothic Novels, 270.
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be a doer at any price and he strives towards perfection. His failure,
however, is a terrible shock for him:
How can I describe my emotions at this catastrophe, or how
delineate the wretch whom with such infinite pains and care
I had endeavored to form? His limbs were in proportion, and
I had selected his features as beautiful. Beautiful! Great God!
His yellow skin scarcely covered the work of muscles and
arteries beneath; his hair was of a lustrous black, and flowing;
his teeth of pearly whiteness; but these luxuriances only
formed a more horrid contrast with his watery eyes.'^
The "tendency of the potter to become the slave of his clay", has
become true for Frankenstein. His shock is the proof. Nature's nemesis
deeply affects Frankenstein in the sense of ArnoldJ. Toynbee's remark:
"In the world of action, we know that it is disastrous to treat animals
or human beings as though they were stocks and stones."^'
Isolation and lack of communication—both aspects of cold
ness—shed light on the category of negativity. In romantic literature
Satan very often is described as the hero of coldness. This interrelation
between negativity, evil, and coldness reaches from the Early Middle
Ages to Dante Alighieri, from John Milton to William Beckford, from
Beckford to the romantics—and to modern literature (Thomas Mann,
Sten Nadolny, Christoph Ransmayr, Thomas Bernhard). In Mary
Shelley's Frankenstein subject and quasi-object are intertwined and
separated from one another. The "object" as an element of the subject
can be interpreted as the concretization of the idea including the use of
a form of enlightenment, which underwent a process of reduction. This
reduction leads towards materialistic mechanism. Frankenstein brackets
his sexual drives as a fundamental human quality by identification with
his product in the act of making.
A double problem ensues here: First is Frankenstein's role as
creator and the dialectics of enlightenment (Max Horkheimer, Theodor
Wiesengrund Adorno). His "heated enthusiasm" for science, his Caleb

" Shelley, Frankenstein, 105.
" Arnold J. Toynbee, A Study of History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1948), vol.1,7.
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Williams-like curiosity,'"* urges him to his creation, which coincides
with coldness. But it is not only Frankenstein's isolation, which is
represented in the novel. The monster is forced to experience a far more
devastating isolation, though he is full of goodness 0ean-jacques
Rousseau) and finds happiness to acquire knowledge by sensation and
reflection 0ohn Locke), thus inscribing his tabula rasa-mind. Whereas
Mary's father William Godwin presupposes an enlightened society for
the rise of virtue, the exercise of reason and free will, the monster is
excluded from every possible human communication. His faculties are
without any value, because he lacks—if we use Godwin's words— all
"sentiments of benevolence andsympathy...and science and abstraction
will soon become cold, unless they derive new attractions from ideas of
society.""
Second is Frankenstein's personal relation to the monster. The
question arises whether Frankenstein is a mother to the monster. It is
difficult to assume that no mode of love at all is involved in his creation.
But it has been suggested that his creativity is a substitute for love: his
action is similar to engendering. Like God Frankenstein is at the same
time a enthusiastic, but not a loving substitute for father and mother.
This paradoxical situation is emphasized by Frankenstein's life without
human love. Within this pattern, the monster cannot be Frankenstein's
partner in an ego—alter ego—relationship (Ich/Auch-Ich). Throughout
the novel It always remains the object, bound to Frankenstein's self
(Ich/Objekt)" : "he becomes a 'father' himself; but his child becomes
his 'sin,' a rejected fleshly being."'^Though the monster appears as
Frankenstein's Z)o/»pe/g(«»ger, its subjectivity is never accepted. Thus the
maker's enthusiasm has its origin in striving towards/exertion of power;
it is neither the enthusiasm of a loving nor of a lovable human [?!]
being.'

" "Curiosity is a principle that carries its pleasures, as well as its pains, along with it." (William
Godwin, Caleb Williams or Thirty as They Are, intro. George Sherburn (New York: Holt,
Rinehart, and Winston, 1965), 141.
" William Godwin, Enquiry Concerning Political Justice, ed.by Isaac Kramnick (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976), 300.
"Hans Blumenberg, "Ich-bin und Urgleichzeitigkeit,"in Ein mogliches Selbstverstandnis(1997),
213-219.
" Shelley, Frankenstein, Introduction, 36.
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The logic of the monster is separated from the logic of Franken
stein's creation by a chasm. If Frankenstein was "dizzy" in the moment
of creation—what does this state of mind mean? What is the meaning of
his confusion? Is "heated" enthusiasm a state of mind, which makes
clear processes of thought impossible? If the process of creation
translates categories into dynamism, is it then simultaneously possible
to be conscious of the mental structures? The indissolubility of horror
is defined by the contrast between the achievements of the transcenden
tal self in conjunction with imagination and the limits of causality. The
reader after all is urged to reflect on the measure of identity, if he
compares Frankenstein and the monster. The exchange of perspectives
points towards the confrontation between self experience and the
experience of otherness. When the monster craves for love, an absurd
or at least ironical level is reached, because Frankenstein's achievement
comprises different modes of relativity. He cannot love the monster,
because he is neither parent nor partner and he is shocked by the
ugliness (imperfection) of his creation. In his absolute isolation
Frankenstein destroyed all forms of love by seeking the subhme. The
triumph of sublimity—which is not complete anyway—coincides with
self-destruction in the arctic ice desert. Coldness and heated enthusiasm
converge—and lead to death.
In William Beckford's Vathek as well as in Lord Byron's drama
Manfred we do find a more subjective form of an aesthetics of coldness
compared to Frankenstein. Caliph Vathek's curiosity strives at the
secrets of heaven, Frankenstein's at the secrets of nature (Maurice
Hindle). Vathek's journey ends in Eblis's (Satan's) kingdom. In the
sublimity of the subterranean halls the Caliph and his mistress
Nouronihar behold groups of promenading people, of whom
"several...kept their right hands on their hearts, without once regarding
any thing around them...They all avoided each other."'® The sight of
evil in all ist grandeur has to be paid for by the loss of communication
and even by the loss of love. Eblis' youthful appearance, displaying the
beauty and depravity of the fallen archangel, presented in the chilly
fire of hell is a climax in Beckford's novel. When the privilege is given
to Vathek and Nouronihar to look at even the most precious treasures,
no power to overcome their dejection ensues. Malignity implies a form
William Beckford, Vathek, in Fairclough, ed., Three Gothic Novels,109-10.
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of inner revenge—in an utterly Christian mode—by the permanent
consuming fire in the hearts, which in the final analysis is identical with
coldness. Riches do not affect them any longer, power cannot offer any
satisfaction. Cruelty lacks any glimpse of love. What remains is desire
without hope: a paralysis or stasis. From hell no way toward salvation
is open: the subterranean palace bars any movement into the opposite
direction. There is no ascension comparable to Goethe's Faust or to
Hegel's Phanomenologie des Geistes (where the empirical subjectivity
ascends towards absolute knowledge). The wish to turn towards evil
manifests itself finally as Vathek's determinate burning downward.The
principle of exclusive amorality is transformed into artistic shape.
According to Kant, who presupposes man's natural malignity, however,
evil cannot be transformed into aesthetic formality: "Soviel wir
einsehen, ist ein...Verbrechen einer formlichen (ganz nutzlosen) Bosheit
zu begehen, Menschen unmdglich, und doch (obzwar blofie Idee des
AuCerst-Bosen) in einem System der Moral nicht zu iibergehen."" It is
important to note that this Kantian statement does not contradict his
general assessment of man as being evil from nature.'*"
The sesthetic reflection on Beckford's Vathek, however, leads to a
qualification of Kant's statement on the formality of evil. Though the
idea of extreme malignity is a necessary conceptual construct within the
framework of Kant's ethical system, it can be transferred to another
system, aesthetics. Especially the total uselessness of malignity makes it
plausible that evil as a phenomenon of uselessness must have a place
within aesthetics. Further on evil as an object of aesthetic appreciation
can claim to excite "interesseloses Wohlgefallen."** Within aesthetics the
idea of evil loses the relation to possible (real) actions by assuming the
quality of a negative ideal (prototypon transcendentale). Beckford's
novel is therefore based on the tension between ethics and aesthetics. In
the field between idea and world, Vathek represents the level of romantic
irony, because the Ego in its simplicity denies all definitions, but
simultaneously construes all contents, which it claims to be exclusively

" Immanuel Kant, Metaphyisik der Sitten, ed. Karl Vorlander (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag,
1966), 146.
" Immanuel Kant, Die Religion innerhalh der Grenzen der hlofien Vemunft,ed. Karl Vorlander
(Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1961), 33-47.
Imannuel Kant, Kritik der Urteikkrafi (1922), 40 seq.
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valid for itself. Referring to Fichte, Hegel writes in the introduction to
hisAsthetik (1835): "Was ist, ist nur durch das Ich, und was durch mich
ist, kann ich ebenso auch wieder vernichten."'*^
The negativity of irony is embedded in Vathek's moral essence; his
vanity is reflected in his ruthlessness and in his inability to find
satisfaction by accessible pleasures. In his owrre^tcAer-mentality Vathek
is craving for the absolute, which by definition may be something or
nothing. Vathek's desire opts for the negative side. The master-slave
relationship'*' is important in Beckford's novel (as in Frankenstein):
Vathek's amorality is visible, when he uses his subjects totally as means
to ends.
By his thoughtless grandiosity he degrades them into mere objects.
His boundless egotism is breathtaking in its obliviousness to his kinship
with humanity. Insofar as Hegel excludes an aesthetics of negativity, his
dialectics cannot offer a solution for the problems expressed in Beckford's text:
An jene...affirmativen Machte schliefJen sich sogleich andere
entgegengesetzte an, die Machte namlich des Negativen,
Schlechten und Bosen iiberhaupt. Das bloC Negative jedoch
darf in der idealen Darstellung einer Handlimg als der wesentliche Grund fiir die notwendige Reaktion seine Stelle nicht
finden. Die Realitat des Negativen kann zwar dem Negativen
und dessen Wesen und Natur entsprechen; wenn aber der
innere Begriff und Zweck bereits in sich selber nichtig ist, so
lafit die schon innere HafSlichkeit noch weniger in seiner
aufSeren Realitat eine echte Schonheit zu....Der Teufel fiir sich
ist deshalb eine schlechte, asthetisch unbrauchbare Figur;
....Das B6se...ist im allgemeinen in sich kahl und gehaltlos,
weil aus demselben nichts als selber nur Negatives, Zerstorung und Ungliick herauskommt, wahrend uns die echte
Kunst den Anblick der Harmonic in sich darbieten soil."'*'*

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Asthetik, hrsg.v. Friedrich Bassenge mit einer Einfuhrung
von Georg Lukacs (Frankfurt: Europaische Verlagsanstalt, n.d.), vol.1,72.
" See Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Phdnomenologie des Geistes, ed. Hermann Glockner
(Stuttgan: Frommann-Holzburg, 1964), 153-58.
" Hegel,/srienife 1,218-19.
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Hegel's idea of romanticism favors a Christian and positive perspective
within the framework of absolute subjectivity, which is characterized
by independence and freedom. According to Hegel a protagonist like
Beckford's Eblis therefore could not claim testhetic quality. It is no
wonder that Hegel's Asthetik includes only three references to Milton,
which cannot claim to do justice to this important poet. Hegel states
that he prefers Dante, because he seems to him to be more substantial
concerning originality of invention, execution, and epic objectivity.'*'
Literary scholars never doubted that in Paradise Lost Satan figures as the
predominant hero.
In English romantic literature the negative hero is a central type.
Examples of this type can be found not only in Mary Shelley's and
Percy Bysshe Shelley's works, but also in Lord Byron's plays and long
poems. In Byron's Manfred we encounter a "soul in agony" (Samuel
Taylor Coleridge, The Ancient Mariner), which—similar to Milton's
Satan and Beckford's Vathek—yyes expression to the spirit of rebellion
and negativity. It is important to note that Byron's philosophical
reflections are not determined by idealism, though idealistic tendencies
cannot be excluded. For years Byron tried to solve the matter-spirit
question. Romantic craving for infinity and eternity is frustrated on
account of man's nature, which unrelentingly leads him toward death:
"[Byron] never forgot having seen Shelley's brain bubble in cranium
when the corpse was burned."'" In Thomas Moore's edition of sources
on Byron's life and work, a fascinating reflection on mind and matter
is printed: "Matter is eternal, always changing, but reproduced, and, as
far as we can comprehend eternity, eternal; and why not mind.' 'Why
should not the mind act with and upon the universe, as portions of it
act upon and with the congregated dust called mankind.' See how one
man acts upon himself and others, or upon multitudes! The same
agency, in a higher and purer degree, may act upon the stars, &c. ad
infinitum."'*^
In Byron's Manfred the intellectual aspiration of the hero is set
against the substantiality and solidity of nature. Byron's reflection on
matter and mind quoted from Moore is given dramatic representation.

Hegel,
467.
Paul West, Byron or the Spoiler's A rt (London; Chatto and Windus, 1960), 65.
" Thomas Moore, The Life, Letters, and Journals of Lord Byron (London, 1829), 653.
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when the poet contrasts Manfred's infinite mind on one side with his
temporal limitation as a living being and with everlasting nature on the
other side. Heroism and coldness go together in Manfred-, the play
includes the hero's subjective coldness and the coldness of the alpine
scenery.
When Manfred learns that he cannot command the higher spirits,
he leaves the common world—society of men—and ascends into the
mountains. On purpose he separates from his fellow creatures. He
shuns communication and tries to find peace in a world which forbids
human communication. Manfred seeks the solitude of the alpine scene
in order to converse with nature. When he meets the hunter in the
mountains, who offers human warmth and comfort, he says:
I am most sick at heart—nay, grasp me not—
I am all feebleness—the mountains whirl
Spinning around me—I grow blind—What art thou?""
Though the poet indicates that Manfred has committed a mysterious
crime, which scholars have related to Byron's incestuous relationship
to his half-sister Augusta Leigh, the most important element in the
drama is Manfred's state of mind and his series of reflections. His
despair is related to his inability to reach the eternal regions either
intellectually or empirically. The transition towards transcendence is
barred for him. As he cannot solve the matter-spirit problem he only
wants forgetfulness. But Manfred rejects corruption of his self: he even
defies Satan, when he is commanded to kneel before him. The Spirit of
the Glacier, which Manfred calls up at the beginning of the drama, is a
high-ranking being. He symbolizes coldness, the freezing of the blood,
post mortem rigidity, noiseless death in the Alps. This spirit stands for
the absolute No. If nature's principle is life, it must, however, be
doubted, whether individual life is included. It could be suggested to see
in Manfred of the contrast between passion (Manfred's unrequited love
for Astarte) and coldness (loftiness of mind, inanimate state).
The beauty of ice goes together with one's own self-sacrifice by
death. Time and again romanticism used ice as the metaphor of

' Lord Byron's Works (Leipzig, 1866), Tauchnitz, vol.IV, 187. Quoted hereafter as Byron IV.
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nothingness. The quiet death, hardness, the acute and biting quality of
the crystals is very often combined with the fantastical scenarios of
coldness in the high mountains, as we have seen in Mont Blanc and
Frankenstein. In Manfred's death hour the abbot tries to convince him
to pray. Manfred dies in soHtude.
ABBOT: Cold—cold—even to the heartBut yet one prayer—Alas! how fares it with thee?
MANFRED: Old man! 'tis not so difficult to die.'"
If we return to Caspar David Friedrich's The Ice Sea or The Doomed
Hope we encounter again the problem of restriction. Restriction aims
at the principle of subjectivity, if lack of meaningfulness forces the self
to return exclusively towards himself for creating sense. The self's
movement between world and death produces despair, which only can
be overcome by nihilism: the substitution of one's own willpower for
the vacuum of meaning. The romantic self holds itself to be a higher
being though it is pressed by the cosmological structures and the laws
of nature:
And from the planks, far shatter'd o'er the rocks.
Built me a little bark of hope.'°
Byron's work cannot exclusively be seen as an epitome of aesthetic and
ontological coldness. Nevertheless it includes coldness as an element
neither to be excluded nor to be overlooked. The tendency towards the
sublime does not always and in melancholy and despair as in Franken
stein and Vathek, but may find a political counterbalance. Byron's
defying of principles and authorities defines his nihilism, which
simultaneously allows a deep belief in an eternal substance. This
substance drives his heroes onward to change the world, to fight, to
wander, though it may be doubtful, whether there will be a victory or
a coming home at the very end. Coldness therefore provides one of the
principles in Byron's poetical outlook. The other extreme is permanent
activity, energy and the fire of revolution. The possibility of revolution
Byron, IV, 218.
" Byron, n, 167 (Childe Harold's Pilgrimage, IV, 105).
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was still meaningful within the framework of romanticism, whereas in
our postmodern times coldness—and thus an aesthetics of coldness, has
acquired a state of hopelessness, which seems to tend towards perma
nence. Byron's principle of hope finds expression in his famous lines;
Yet, Freedom! yet thy banner, torn, but flying.
Streams like the thunder-storm against the wind. "
In Edgar Allan Poe's The Narrative of Arthur Gordon Pym (1838) we
encounter a new variation of coldness. Poe combines in his text
external or objective coldness of the Antarctic scenery with the internal
or subjective coldness of the narrator. The aesthetic quality of horror is
amalgamated with an artistic attitude, which gives a diagnosis of the
darker side of the self. Subjective coldness in Poe's sense intertwines
psychological and intellectual detachment and thus foreshadows the
rise of modernism, which found expression in Baudelaire. Intellectual
coldness, which is characteristic for symbolism and early modernism
can be expressed scientifically and artistically. Poe's description of the
Antarctic evokes a world of coldness and clarity, which, however, at the
end of the book dissolves into Friedrich's horizon in The Ice Sea:
In latitude 70° 23' some large islands of ice were observed of
a snowy whiteness, indicating the vicinity of field-ice. In
latitude 71° 10', longitude 106° 54' W., the navigators were
stopped, as before, by an immense frozen expanse, which
filled the whole area of the southern horizon. The northern
edge of this expanse was ragged and broken, so firmly wedged
together as to be utterly impassible, and extending about a
mile to the southward. Behind it the frozen surface was
comparatively smoothed for some distance, until terminated
in the extreme background of gigantic ranges of ice moun
tains, the one towering above the other.

Byron II, 165 {Childe Harold,TV,98).
" Edgar Allan Poe, The NarrativeojfArthur Gordon Pym (New York: The Heritage Press, 1930),
183.
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Whereas this description of the Antarctic ice reminds us of the
foreground in Caspar David Friedrichs's painting, the closing scene of
Poe's Arthur Gordon Pym parallels the background in its amalgam
ation of fog, light, and ether." Arthur and Peters are rushing in their
canoe towards the cataract: "But there arose in our pathway a shrouded
human figure, very far larger in ist proportions than any dweller among
men. And the hue of the skin of the figure was of the perfect whiteness
of the snow."" The fatal power of coldness is transfigured into a
superhuman specter, which represents the icy death of the Antarctic
zone. Adventure has led into a realm of natural power, the landscape of
no return. According to Christoph Ransmayr, modern traveling
transforms our earth into a small world, but it leads to the illusion that
our flight over the pack-ice reduces the insurmountable force of
destruction; "Aber, frage ich Sie, geehrtesPublikum, wohin konnte sich
eine solchermafien bedrohte Mannschaft in der Dunkelheit der
Polarnacht noch retten? Auf die Schollen hinaus? Oder ins Wasser, das
zwischen den klaffenden Rissen des Eises tosend und schwarz nach oben
schofi.?""

^ Baudelaire ^
Modernism transfers coldness from the external world into the inner
world of the self: comprising subjective strategies like distancing,
isolating and a new way of seeing (the cold eye). The aesthetics of
coldness consequently does not end with the romantic school, but is
spreading out variations, starting a development, via dandyism/symbol
ism (Charles Baudelaire), aestheticism (impressionism, I'artpour I'art)
up to modernism. Nietzsche's relevance for this development has
continuously been emphasized in recent years. When Baudelaire ends
his poem Remords Posthume with the lines:

" Peter Rautmann, C D. Friedrich, 23.
^ Voe, Arthur Gordon Pym, 264.
Christoph Ransmayr and Rudi Palla, "Der letzte Mensch," in Uwe Wittstock, ed., Die
Erfindung der Welt. Zum Werk von Christoph Ransmayr (Frankfurt: Fischer Taschenbuch
Verlag, 1997), 48.

Msthetics of Coldness

103

Si, quelque soir, d'un pleur obtenu sans effort
Tu pouvais seulement, o reine des cruelles!
Obscurir la splendeur de tes froides prunellas.''
tbe emphasis on distance and cruelty shows an antiromantic quality.
Destruction seems to be more important than any kind of teleology.
Baudelaire's world is looked at by a new medium, the dandy. The
dandy does not strive for a new balance of nature and spirit, but lives
amidst civilization.He is like a mirror reflecting the surrounding world,
but he is at the same time capable to reflect on himself looking at
others. The dandy wants to attract attention and to evoke irritation.
His self-dramatization nourishes his pride, because his egocentric
hankering after attention is not complemented by sympathy: he
suppresses spontaneity and emotional response to maintain his distance
toward the lives, problems, destinies of others. Similar to the Byronic
hero, but different from the first generation of English romanticists'
(Coleridge, Wordsworth) striving at a harmony between spirit and
nature, Baudelaire's dandy claims and needs the aura of darkness,
secrecy, mystery and opacity; sphinx-like he acts from a realm un
known to the others, combining intellect and irony; he cultivates a new
mode of coldness, a mixture of feelings (fascination, aversion, anxiety),
which gives a chock-effect. The dandy's elegant forms of attacking and
distorting conventions, thus challenging, but not destroying them
combine chock and fascination. His public shares his values, education
and life style, so that the highlife of the establishment Giving expres
sion to his "sentiment de destinee eternellement solitaire." The dandy
plays with his public provoking alternatively attraction and repulsion.
He deeply despises the bourgeois as the representative of common sense
and utilitarianism, though he needs him for his acts of negation.'^
Whereas the romanticists aim at a dissolution of irony within the idea
of the absolute (natural philosophy, philosophy of art), the dandy
represents an anti-romantic stance. The esthetics of dandyism does not
acknowledge any harmonizing tendency in the sense of striving to

^ Charles Baudelaire, Les Fleurs du Mai/Die Blumen des Bosen, trans. Friedhelm Kemp
(Frankfurt: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1971), 60.
"See Hiltrud Gniig, Kultder Kilter: DerKlassische Dandyim Spiegel derWeltliteratur (Stuttgart:
J. B. Metzler, 1988), 41.
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natural subjectivity/emotional expression. Instead of being engulfed by
romantic warmth, the inner sensations, conceptions, moods are held
under control by the dandy's self in the closed rooms (salons, clubs).
In contrast to the romanticist the dandy repudiates any spirituaUzation of nature (emotions, sensations), because he defines spontaneous
natural sensations as an opaque mechanism of psychic processes, whose
external causes cannot be discovered by the self, so that the self is urged
to cope with these deterministic drives using coldness {impassibiliti) as
a weapon of self-defense.
Love is no longer seen as a romantic ideal, but as pure sexuality in
the sense of animal nature. The necessity of sexual fulfillment Baudel
aire conceives as Satanism. Romantic irony in Baudelaire is transformed
into an irony of coldness: the dandy's heightened consciousness
comprehends his own determinism, the satanic drive of self-depravation
and humiliation.'' The dandy comprises coldness and intellectual
brilliance, both the sources of esthetic originality, which demonstrate
secretive individual projections of an unaffected ego. Consciousness thus
is used as a filter for the stream of impressions and information, which
are poured over the self from without or originate from the resorts of
memory. The mind screens the dandy from emotion, keeps off the
thrill, but is neutralized by chock. The dandy wants insensibiUty or
coldness amalgamated with stoicism. Therefore he uses camouflage,
masks, in order to hide his self, whereas the others are kept in distance.
He keeps his spontaneous emotions and intentions secret, but he
abstains from hypocrisy. The dandy is well-versed in the art of lying,
fully conscious of his aesthetics, which conceives art as a mode of lying
(fiction, literary artifact)." According to Baudelaire the dandy prefers
to keep the secret of his person to himself: "L'observateur est un prince
qui jouit partout de son incognito."" His markers thus are silence,
luxury, secret pleasures and perversions. He prefers cold love to hot
passions; his sexuality reminds of laboratory work, so that the dandy
can be seen as a monster of society. This attitude is further on reflected
in his reserved attitude toward women; they are^ reduced to beautiful

^ Gniig, Kult der Kdlter, 45.
" See Oscar Wilde, 7^e Decay of Lying, in The Collected Works of Oscar Wilde (Ware:
Wordsworth Editions, 1997), 775-99.
" Baudelaire, (JEuvres complete,11,692
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and cruel animals (beasts of prey): "La femme est le contraire du
Dandy."'' Sexual comsumption is derived from the dandy's selfknowledge comprising power and attraction, both of which are directed
at women as works of art. The dandy cultivates the high art of unveiling
and disguise, so that erotic fascination is incited by fashion as an erotic
art.
Baudelaire gave the impulse to the formation of symbolism and
aestheticism, which characterized late nineteenth century French and
English literature. Both movements implied an aesthetics of coldness ,
though shifts of emphasis are recognizable.

" Gnug, Kult derKdlter, 57

